INTRODUCTION
The UK Government has proposed significant reforms to the 'wrongful trading' remedy in s.214 Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) in order to enhance the amount of financial compensation recovered under the remedy rule from wrongdoing directors 1 . The proposals have been advanced as part of a package of measures that are intended to enhance 'transparency and trust' in UK businesses, but which have a particular focus on expanding civil liability provisions to combat director misconduct 2 .
The s. 214 remedy allows a court to impose unlimited personal liability on a director of an insolvent company who is found to have allowed his or her company to continue trading at a time when they knew, or ought to have concluded, that the company could not avoid insolvent liquidation. 3 The granting liquidators a power of sale or assignment over the proceeds of wrongful trading claim 17 . The proposals are, as such, likely to find favour with those who regard s.214 is a fundamentally effective remedy that has been derailed by unfortunate statutory restrictions.
This paper argues, however, that neither the current reforms, nor more far reaching amendments to wrongful trading remedy, are likely to meet the goal of significantly expanding civil recovery under the provision. The paper shows that extending the remedy to companies in administration will only modestly expand the number of cases that fall with section and argues that granting liquidators etc., a power of sale of wrongful trading actions is unlikely to bring the benefits claimed in the Transparency and Trust consultation papers. More broadly, however, the paper contends that there is little evidence to support the contention that civil recovery under s.214 has been significantly held back by the current statutory rules, such as the liquidation condition. It is argued that the limited impact of the s.214 remedy is more readily attributable to factors independent of those rules and, therefore, that any set of technical reforms are unlikely to bring about a significant increase in civil recovery let alone bring about levels of recovery that would equate to the "radical" expansion of director liability that the Cork Report sought from the remedy. In presenting its analysis, the paper highlights significant gaps in the understanding of the regulatory problem to which the wrongful trading remedy responds, and argues that these gaps result in an exaggerated understanding of the role that any such remedy is likely to play in creditor protection.
The paper is structured as follows. The next part sets out the nature and scope of the wrongful trading remedy, analysing in particular the case presented for the remedy by the Cork Committee, the emphasis that it placed on 'market failure' in commercial relationships as creating a pressing need for the rule, and it's implicit claims as to the widespread nature of the problem of insolvent, or wrongful trading. In this context, the section discusses the compensatory and deterrent aspects of the wrongful trading rule and argues that the compensation aspect is key to the success of the rule. The next part considers the restrictions placed on the s.214 rule, discussing the particular role that the 'liquidation rule' has played in limiting the impact of the remedy, and considering the likely impact of the current reform proposals. The following part presents evidence from a wide range of sources to rebut the claim that statutory restrictions, such as the liquidation rule, are the principle reason for the limited impact of the provision. In particular, the section shows that 'insolvent trading' is very rarely identified as a matter of directors' misconduct in a large sample of director disqualification cases and that comparative evidence from the Australian wrongful trading rule similarly shows that levels of litigation under a wrongful trading rule are little higher where different statutory criteria are adopted. The final substantive section of the paper argues that the wrongful trading remedy, as a creditor protection rule, is subject to inherent limitations in it's scope meaning that, whilst useful in some cases, it is most unlikely to bring about a 'radical' regime of director liability, howsoever liability rules are structured. The final section presents concluding remarks.
THE SECTION 214 REMEDY.
The Case for a Wrongful Trading Rule.
The case that the Cork Committee presented for the introduction of the wrongful trading remedy was firmly rooted in concern that limited liability can lead to a certain degree of 'indifference and lack of concern' on the part of corporate managers about the level of indebtedness of financially troubled companies 18 . This analysis reflects a common criticism of limited liability, namely, that by allowing 17 Small Business Enterprise and Employment HC Bill, n 1 above, cll. 105 & 106. 18 Cork Report, n 4 above, para 1741.
entrepreneurs to cap losses from corporate activity to nominal sums the rule shifts the cost of corporate failure from entrepreneurs to creditors and increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs become indifferent to downside financial risks 19 . This, so the argument goes, can be particularly dangerous when companies encounter difficult financial circumstances because entrepreneurs may feel that they have nothing to lose, but everything to gain, from continuing to trade an insolvent company in the hope that 'something turns up ' . 20 In principle, of course, creditors might be expected to guard against such conduct, either by monitoring entrepreneurs' conduct for the duration of the credit relationship or by negotiating payments to compensate themselves for increased risk of loss.
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In practice, however, high monitoring and contracting costs, combined with informational asymmetries, may prevent such effective risk management, which has led many, including the Cork Committee, to conclude that a 'market failure' is likely to leave many creditors exposed to an increased likelihood of wrongdoing in limited liability companies.
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For Cork the case for a "radical extension" 23 of civil liability for directors who recklessly continued to trade financially troubled companies beyond the point where they had no hope of recovery was clear. Personal liability would remove the protective cloak of limited liability from wrongdoers, allowing creditors to be compensated and acting as a general deterrent of such 'abuse of limited liability' 24 . The White Paper on reform of insolvency law that followed the Cork Committee's report, 25 readily accepted this analysis and the need to combat perverse incentives from 'limited liability' continues to be cited as the central justification for the rule in s.214.
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The Structure of the Remedy
The standard of liability for 'wrongful trading' is set out in s.214(2) IA 1986, which provides that the court may impose personal liability on a director of a company that has entered insolvent liquidation where it can be shown that they were responsible for continued trading of a company at a time when they knew "or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation". A defence is available if a director is able to show that he took "every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors"
27
.
It is clear, though, that whilst concern about 'indifference or lack of concern' amongst directors for corporate liabilities was the trigger for the introduction of the wrongful trading remedy, s.214 is not limited to this particular type of misconduct. The key to liability is to show trading at a time when the company was known to be insolvent, or ought to have been known to be insolvent, and so any such 'insolvent' trading may be caught whether it is borne out of indifference to creditors' plight or, say, a desire to remove valuable assets from an insolvent company to prevent them falling into the hands of creditors in insolvency proceedings 28 (provided of course that the 'reasonable prospect' test is met at the time of the transaction).
In interpreting and applying the statutory criteria for liability, however, the courts have been mindful of the danger of provoking directors to place companies into insolvency proceedings prematurely through too strict an approach to the standard of liability. 29 38 The study was conducted through a search of the Westlaw database of cases. Two search protocols were run in the database. The terms of the first search were "Insolvency Act 1986" + "section 214" in the advanced search function. The second search was for all references to "wrongful trading" or "insolvent trading" in the 'subject/keyword' box. Full case reports of all 'hits' from these searches were then examined to determine whether the cases dealt with a substantive or procedural issue relevant to s.214 proceedings. Equivalent searches were carried out using 'Lexis Law Library' and 'BAILII' on-line data bases for further coverage of reported cases. Of course, not every wrongful trading action, successful or otherwise, will make it to the law reports and to this end, it has been suggested that the reported cases may under-represent use of the remedy in so much as liquidators are successful in using the threat of litigation under s.214 to obtain a settlement from directors without the need for formal litigation 45 . However, no detailed empirical evidence has been offered to support this claim 46 , still less has any evidence been offered to suggest that directors are more likely to settle a claim for wrongful trading than they are any other personal claim against them, such as claims for misfeasance or breach of duty under s.212 IA 1986, or a claim relating to a transaction at a preference or undervalue. So whilst, obviously, some wrongful trading cases will be settled without formal litigation, there is no reason to suppose that settlements have a disproportionate impact on the reporting of wrongful trading cases. Indeed, as Cheffins points out, successful settlement of s.214 claims would be unlikely without a credible threat of litigation, and the low number of reported cases does not readily support liquidators in making such a threat 47 . misconduct. As part of an inquiry into the response of directors of FTSE companies to punitive regulation, Baldwin studied the main 'drivers' behind directors' efforts to manage regulatory risks. He found that 'corporate', as opposed to 'personal', concerns were the most important factors motivating compliance with regulatory standards. Some 90% of the directors questioned as part of Baldwin's research cited 'concern for their company's reputation' as an important driver of their conduct, with many fewer citing 'personal sanctions' as the most important driver of their conduct.
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But even setting aside doubts about the general effectiveness of civil liability rules in deterring director misconduct, the deterrent effect of wrongful trading rule is likely to be significantly weakened by the low number of wrongful trading cases. Cheffins has noted that effective deterrence of wrongful trading through the provision of civil liability rests on active enforcement of the legislation 59 , and for good reason. Perverse incentives from limited liability will surely only be effectively countered if directors feel that there is a strong prospect of civil recovery being imposed for wrongful trading. The fewer instances of actual recovery there are, therefore, the less likely we could expect the possibility of civil liability to be in countering errant behaviour. Of course, this is not to say that the wrongful trading rule will have no deterrent effect. The existence of the rule may well influence directors' behaviour simply because of its setting an expected norm of behaviour. But if liability does not seem likely then directors may still feel that they have 'much to gain, and nothing to lose' from insolvent trading, in spite of the existence of the remedy.
Indeed, it is notable in this respect that the Transparency and Trust papers focused squarely on enhancing the compensatory aspect of the wrongful trading remedy as the means to 'better protect creditors' and made little or no direct reference to enhancing the deterrent aspect of the sanction as driver of reform 60 . It would, of course, probably be wrong to conclude from this that the Government saw little or no deterrent benefit from the sanction, but it does illustrate still further the degree to which effective deterrence of wrongful trading is seen as dependant upon the compensatory aspect of the remedy.
THE 'LIQUIDATION' RULE
A key feature of s.214 that has been blamed for restricting the impact of the remedy is the rule limiting standing to bring a claim for wrongful trading to liquidators of companies that have entered insolvent liquidation. There are two aspects to the liquidation rule that have been seen as limiting the scope of the sanction, both of which the current reform proposals seek to address.
The Scope of the Wrongful Trading Rule
Most straight-forwardly, the simple restriction of the remedy to companies that have entered insolvent liquidation, 61 that is companies that enter liquidation at a time when their assets are insufficient to discharge their liabilities, including the expenses of winding up
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, means that the remedy is unavailable in the case of companies that enter other forms of insolvency proceedings, such as 58 Ibid, 368. 59 Cheffins, n 47 above. On the importance of likelihood of sanction on the deterrent effect of regulatory rules, see also Baldwin et al, Understanding Regulation, n 54 above. 60 administration, or no insolvency proceedings at all. The liquidation restriction was not part of the Cork Committee proposals for the wrongful trading rule, which recommended simply that an action for wrongful trading should be available to any liquidator, administrator or creditor of a company where trading was found to have taken place at a time when the director knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the company that was insolvent on a cash flow basis. 63 The Government of the day, however, concluded that such a broad power of civil recovery would have the effect of deterring genuine entrepreneurs from operating businesses 64 and, as a result took the decision to restrict wrongful trading liability to directors of companies that entered insolvent liquidation. Limiting wrongful trading liability to winding-up cases in this way was seen to strike a better balance between the respective rights of creditors and entrepreneurs. No evidence as to the advantage of the more restricted rule was, however, presented by the Government and subsequent developments in directors' duties rules rather suggest that concerns about a broader liability rule deterring entrepreneurs were, at best, exaggerated. The decision in Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd 65 that the 'interests of the company' become identified with the interests of the companies' creditors where insolvency is very likely, has instituted potential directorial liability for insolvent trading 66 that is not tied to formal insolvency proceedings and few, if any, commentators have suggested that this rule has deterred entrepreneurs from incorporating. So it is no surprise that liquidation rule has come to be regarded as an unnecessary restriction on the s.214 remedy and a significant contributing factor to low levels of litigation under the provision 67 .
In direct response to these concerns the current reforms seek to extend the wrongful trading remedy to companies that enter insolvent administration, as well as insolvent liquidation 68 . However, it seems unlikely that this modest extension of wrongful trading liability will have a dramatic impact on the number of cases brought under the provision. In 2012, for example, over 16,000 69 companies were recorded as entering liquidation proceedings in England and Wales, of which the vast majority are likely to be insolvent liquidation proceedings. During the same period, however, just 2,500 companies entered administration. The total number of companies entering administration therefore represented less than 20% of the number of liquidations. Extending the wrongful trading remedy still further to other forms of insolvency proceeding, in addition to administration, would also seem unlikely to result in a significant rise in cases. administration might be expected to produce some expansion in civil recovery, the upswing is not likely to be transformative. And this is especially so when it is borne in mind that some companies that enter administration will go on to enter liquidation proceedings and so account for a portion of current s.214 cases.
Of course, it might be argued that extending the wrongful trading remedy to companies that enter administration could nonetheless bring about beneficial increases in the deterrent effect of the sanction, in so much as it encouraged greater care of corporate assets in circumstances where insolvent administration is likely, and not just insolvent liquidation. This could be particularly significant in so much as the assets of companies that enter administration proceedings may be greater than the assets those that enter liquidation. However, it seems unlikely that significant new gains in terms of preserving corporate assets will be made by the new rules. For one thing, the deterrent effect of the reformed wrongful trading remedy, whether in liquidation or administration cases, is still likely to be limited by a low likelihood of sanction. For another, it is doubtful whether the new rules would in fact break significant new ground in terms of deterrence. From the standpoint of the average director, the deterrent effect of the existing rule in s.214, such as it is, will surely come into play as soon as the solvency of their company is in serious and long-term doubt such that it looks likely that insolvency proceedings are inevitable. It would be a brave, or more likely foolhardy, director who in full knowledge of the s.214 rule concluded that even though the solvency of their company was in long-term doubt such that there was 'no reasonable prospect' of avoiding insolvency proceedings, they did not need to worry about 'wrongful trading' liability because they were sure that their company would only enter insolvent administration, not liquidation. Of course few, if any directors, could be so confident -compulsory winding up following a creditors' petition is always a possibility in an 'insolvent' company 71 . So my argument here is that the trigger for the deterrent effect the existing s.214 rule is surely the onset of serious financial distress such that some insolvency proceeding looks inevitable. It is not foresight of the particular type of insolvency proceeding that the company eventually enters, which is not something that is wholly within the directors' power to determine in any case. Further, it is also worth noting that potential director liability for insolvent trading before administration is not, in any case, entirely without precedent in English law. , which gives the expenses of winding up priority over a floating charge where the assets of the company are otherwise insufficient to meet them. However, priority over a floating charge does not guarantee that liquidators will be able to cover their costs, as the rule is of little assistance where the assets of the company (including floating charge assets), are in any case insufficient to cover potential litigation costs and other expenses of the winding up.
Creditor-funding of wrongful trading actions has long been canvassed as a potential way around the funding problems that liquidators may encounter in s.214 cases. However, creditors have no direct right of application under the current version of s.214 and so could only fund litigation by indemnifying the liquidator. The likelihood of creditors agreeing to underwrite a wrongful trading application under the current law was, however, restricted by the decision of facie, creditor funding of wrongful trading actions through this new power could increase levels of litigation under the remedy, though, of course, the principle benefit of that litigation would be derived by those creditors who took the benefit of the action from the liquidator (or administrator). Nonetheless, the Transparency and Trust consultation paper envisaged that the introduction of a power of assignment would lead to the development of a 'market' for wrongful trading actions 84 , and so benefit the general body of unsecured creditors to the extent that the proceeds of an assignment would increase the assets of insolvent company, and hence the dividend paid by liquidator 85 .
However, the extent to which the general body of creditors would in fact benefit under the proposed new rules is uncertain and BIS's own impact assessment of the changes, published at the time the Small Business, Enterprise and Regulation Bill 86 was introduced to Parliament, described the number of additional claims that could be expected as "unknown" but likely to be "relatively low" 87 . Creditors are only likely to pay for assignment of rights of action for wrongful trading where the prospects of recovery against an errant director are high, that is, where the director concerned has sufficient assets to be able to satisfy a judgement against them and in cases where there is a high chance of recovery i.e. where it appears that there is a strong chance the elements of liability could be made out in litigation. Any market that developed in wrongful trading claims is therefore likely to concentrate on high-value claims; no creditor is likely to pay for a worthless or speculative claim, or at least, they would not pay very much for them.
However, it is precisely these 'high-end' claims that are most likely to be pursued by liquidators themselves, so it may be the case that the development of a market for rights of action for wrongful trading claims will be hampered by liquidators being unwilling to sell the claims that creditors are most interested in buying. Of course, some liquidators may prefer to sell high-value claims to avoid the expense and delay that litigation entails, essentially preferring 'the bird in hand' of the creditor's offer and a quicker dividend for the general body of creditors. Assuming that some liquidators would be willing to sell on this basis, however, the sale would likely have to be at a significant discount to the expected proceeds of recovery in order to incentivise the creditor to make the purchase. The general body of creditors may therefore end up worse off under the new rules if, as seem likely, they simply resulted in liquidators selling high-value claims at a discount to the 'price' in director liability that could be achieved if the liquidator litigated himself.
Of course, it could be argued that the increased possibility of litigation from the change could enhance the deterrent effect of the wrongful trading rule, benefitting corporate creditors through reduced incidences of wrongful trading. Enhancing the deterrent aspect of the rule was not specifically highlighted as a motivation for change, but the Transparency and Trust consultation paper discussion paper did comment that new powers of assignment would, by enhancing the likelihood of litigation for wrongful trading, encourage directors to settle wrongful trading claims, thereby increasing the flow of funds to creditors. The extent to which either of these things would occur, though, is difficult to gauge and the consultation paper offered no detailed evidence to substantiate its claim about causes of action for fraudulent trading and those held under ss. 238 and 239 of the Act The current reform proposals are therefore unlikely to meet the goal of bringing about a significant increase in financial compensation for creditor victims of wrongful trading, and nor, for that matter, are they likely to significantly enhance the deterrent effect of the wrongful trading rule. But what is nonetheless clear is that the reforms are predicated on the belief that substantial scope exists for expanding civil recovery for wrongful trading. This, of course, is unsurprising given the widespread belief that the s.214 remedy has underperformed relative to the incidence of wrongful trading because of restrictions in remedy itself. In fact, however, there is no clear evidence to bear out this assumption. Indeed, the evidence rather suggests that opportunities for expanding civil recovery for wrongful trading are inherently limited, regardless of the particular rules in s.214. , or in the case of s.6, the official receiver acting on his behalf 100 , disqualification proceedings are not inhibited by the sort of cost issues that may affect civil recovery by the liquidator under s.214. The cost of disqualification litigation is paid by the state and not by individual insolvency practitioners as part of their expenses. Director disqualification cases therefore provide a good source of data from which to gauge the size of the pool of cases in which civil recovery for insolvent trading might be available for creditors, and therefore the impact of procedural rules on levels of recovery under s.214. The Insolvency Service data indicating that 'insolvent trading' is rarely identified in successful disqualification cases is matched by a more detailed study 104 of unfit conduct allegations in 500 disqualification undertaking 105 cases concluded in 2008. In that study, insolvent trading was cited in just 12 undertakings, whereas other conduct deemed detrimental to creditors (such a misuse of company property) was cited much more frequently.
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Data from disqualification cases does not therefore suggest that a relaxation of restrictions, even the substantial relaxation that would be needed to bring criteria for liability in s.214 into line with those applied in disqualification, would be likely to result in significantly increased levels of litigation under the provision. Indeed, the low incidence of insolvent trading in disqualification cases is particularly stark given that Insolvency Service guidance notes specifically directs the attention insolvency practitioners towards 'insolvent trading' as grounds for disqualification in their initial investigations of the affairs of insolvent companies 107 . levels of recovery under s.214, certainly as compared to other Insolvency Act provisions dealing with director misconduct. But it should be borne in mind too that that directors' 'impecuniosity' is likely to render some, perhaps many, disqualification 'insolvent trading cases' unsuitable for civil recovery proceedings. The fact therefore that we see exactly the same pattern of low incidences of insolvent trading in disqualification proceedings, where significantly more relaxed criteria for liability, as we see from other indicators is surely the most significant aspect of the disqualification data. For it shows that even where significantly more relaxed criteria are applied, incidences of 'insolvent trading', and therefore potential opportunities for civil recovery for 'wrongful trading', are limited, and so are limited regardless of the particular statutory rules in s.214.
Of course, it could be contended that incidences of insolvent trading are underrepresented in disqualification cases, but there is no evidence of this. The argument has been put that disqualification investigations may be skewed by cost and other factors towards less complex allegations of misconduct, such as unfair discrimination against Crown agencies in the payment of tax or failure to file statutory accounts an returns. 108 However, this argument would apply as equally to insolvent trading as it would to other evidentially complex 'transactions to the detriment of creditors' such as undervalue and preference transactions, which are still cited more frequently than insolvent trading in disqualification cases. So even accounting for possible bias within the disqualification system against investigation of complex directorial misconduct, we would still see that insolvent trading is a comparatively rare form of misconduct regardless of the particular rules in s. 214 IA 1986 . On that basis, there is simply no evidence to suggest that relaxation of the rules in s.214, even a far more radical relaxation that that currently proposed, would result in significant expansion of civil recovery under that provision. To put matters another way, this evidence suggests that low levels of litigation under s.214 are not, as is often assumed, principally the result of restrictions on s.214, but the result of limited opportunities for civil recovery under the provision.
C. Comparative Evidence: The Australian Insolvent Trading Rule.
Analysis of the experience of the Australian insolvent trading rule provides still further evidence that relaxation of some of the key procedural restrictions in the UK remedy would be unlikely to significantly increase recovery under s. . The elements of liability for wrongful trading in Australia, whether civil or criminal, are very similar to those in the UK, namely that a person can be held liable for wrongful trading where they allow a company to incur a debt at a time when they knew, or had reasonable grounds to believe, that the company was insolvent 112 . The scope of the Australian provisions has changed over time, but the Australian remedy has typically been wider than those applied in the UK. Australian law has, for example, allowed a much wider group of claimants to bring wrongful trading proceedings. Creditors, criminal prosecution authorities, corporate regulatory agencies (ASIC) and, since 1993, liquidators all enjoy standing to bring claims against errant directors 113 . A subsequent study has noted a particular dearth of cases under the current version of the Australian remedy, in spite of the fact that the provision was drafted with the intention of making claims for wrongful trading easier than under the predecessor provision 118 and continued adherence to a wide set of procedural rules.
Australian law continues, for example, to accommodate claims by individual creditors 119 , albeit in respect of companies in winding up proceedings and subject to prior claims by a liquidator, and permits liquidators to encourage individual creditors to fund wrongful trading litigation by allowing liquidators to ask the court to sanction a special dividend to such creditors 120 .
Blame for the low number of cases reported in Australia has been attributed by one commentator to an apparent shift in Australian insolvency law towards voluntary administration proceedings which it is claimed are less likely to lead to personal claims against directors than formal insolvency proceedings, 121 and the fact that insufficient funds may be available in companies that do enter winding up to make civil recovery actions by liquidators viable 122 . No doubt these factors, if substantiated, would contribute towards a low number of wrongful trading actions in Australia, but what is remarkable is that the Australian remedy appears to have been no more effective over its near 50 year history than s.214 has been in its 27 years. Of course, it is possible that a coincidence of domestic factors could have conspired to render both rules ineffective in spite of significant differences in their scope, but the fact that the Australian rule has not performed well does not support claims that the blame for the poor performance of the UK remedy can be simply attributed to the particular restrictions in s.214, nor does it suggest that a significant upswing in litigation could be expected from the current reform proposals.
THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE SECTION 214 REMEDY.
So there is little evidence that the particular rules in s.214 are key driver behind low levels of litigation under the provision. Rather the principal explanation for the low impact of s.214 may simply lie in the fact that opportunities for civil recovery for wrongful or insolvent trading are limited regardless of the particular criteria applied to the rule. There are several grounds upon which it is argued in the remainder of this article that this is likely to be the case and why, therefore, a reformed, or unreformed wrongful trading remedy it likely to play only a limited role in creditor protection.
The Frequency of 'Insolvent Trading'.
Evidence from UK director disqualification cases suggest that 'insolvent trading' may not be a particularly common form of director misconduct, or at the very least that it is much less common than other form of directorial misconduct connected to insolvency. The Cork Committee was clearly of the view that the problem of directors' 'indifference' to corporate debts as a result of perverse incentives from limited liability was significant in its call for a 'radical extension' of civil liability to be introduced to tackle the problem as a matter of 'urgent necessity' 123 . Acceptance of Cork's implicit claim that the problem was widespread drove early expectations of the impact of s.214 124 , and those expectations have, in turn, underpinned the subsequent near-consensus that the remedy has 'underperformed' relative to the scale of the problem against which it was directed. In fact, however, the Cork Report did not present any empirical evidence as to the scale of the problem of 'indifference and lack of concern' by corporate managers, citing only anecdotal evidence from its consultation 125 in making the 'urgent' case for the new rule.
To be sure, the claim that limited liability increases the likelihood of 'indifference' to levels of corporate debt has a firm grounding in the general literature on limited liability
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, and is particularly prominent in the literature regarding insolvent trading remedies 127 . But again, empirical evidence as to the incidence of the mischief is lacking and it seems, rather, to be assumed that the risk is significant and necessitates a regulatory response because transaction costs and information asymmetries prevent many creditors from effectively managing the risk themselves 128 . In reality, however, evidence from a number of empirical studies challenges the notion that financially distressed companies necessarily engage in 'risk-shifting' and, on the creditor side, patterns of risk adjustment across classes of creditors are complex and easy assumptions of 'market failure' are likely to be misleading.
On the firm side a recent study by Gilje 129 found that risk taking in small US companies in the oil and gas industry actually reduced as the financial conditions of the firm deteriorated. Gilje's conclusions follow those of Andrada and Kaplan 130 who, in a study of 31 firms, found no evidence that financial distress caused companies to engage in risk-shifting through "unusually risky" investment decisions.
Of course, Gilje's study analysed evidence of investment decisions (using firm disclosures to the US Securities and Exchange Commission) in publicly traded US companies active in a particular sector of economic activity. But the fact that the study, consistent with others 131 , failed to find empirical evidence of 'risk-shifting' to creditors in times of financial distress challenges assumptions that limited liability in fact creates significant new risks for creditors in a pre-insolvency context. 123 Cork Report, n 4 above, para 1805. 124 See e.g. Prentice, "Corporate Personality", n 13 above. 125 Cork Report, n 4 above, at para. 1741. The fact that many directors are exposed to financial risks from the failure of their firms, in spite of their limited liability, such as through the provision of personal guarantees for corporate debt 132 , or the provision of loans to their company 133 , is, for one thing, likely to reduce the risk of unusually risky investment decisions in the financial twilight zone. And this is to say nothing of the fact that many directors' concern for their business reputation, and that of the business, might prevent them from engaging in insolvent trading 134 . But even assuming, that risk-shifting does arise in some cases, a wide variety of security and quasi-security devices are nonetheless available to creditors, of all classes, in seeking to manage such credit risks. 135 And even where it is uneconomic for creditors to tailor their terms of credit to individual debtors, experience will no doubt enable them to structure their pricing policy in such a way as to cover the likely level of default across all debtors 136 . None of this, of course, is to say that 'perverse incentives' are not created by limited liability and that actual instances of insolvent trading born of indifference and lack of concern by corporate managers do not arise. They no doubt do in some cases. But the fact that this might happen tells us nothing of the frequency with which it actually does happen and, therefore, whether the levels of reported litigation under a statutory remedy to deal with the problem are or are not appropriate to the incidence of the misconduct.
There is therefore nothing in the Cork Report, or the wider literature,, that provides a sound evidential basis upon which it could be concluded that the current modest levels of litigation under s.214 are dramatically out of line with instances of 'insolvent trading'. In fact, the evidence that we do have from directors' disqualification cases etc., suggests that current levels of litigation under s.214 are very much in line with the broader incidence of insolvent trading, and this fits with the picture of low litigation that we see in comparative analysis of the Australian 'wrongful trading' rule.
Directors' Personal Solvency.
It is also the case that, even where insolvent trading does occur, civil recovery such as that offered by the wrongful trading remedy may be of little benefit to creditors because 'wrongdoing' directors have themselves suffered significant financial loss as a result of corporate failure. The ability of a wrongdoing director to compensate creditors from his or her personal wealth is crucial to successful recovery under the wrongful trading remedy 137 . Where a director has suffered significant personal financial loss as a result of corporate failure, then it simply may not be worth a liquidator, administrator, creditor or any other person pursuing that director for civil recovery, regardless of whether insolvent trading has occurred. Cheffins argues that creditors would be unlikely to choose a generalised personal liability rule such as that in s.214 in bi-lateral contracts with directors because of such fluctuations in director wealth, and so may be little interested in utilising the statutory remedy 138 .
There is a body of evidence to suggest that directors of smaller companies are significantly exposed to financial risk from the failure of their companies, either through the provision of personal guarantees for corporate debt 139 , or through self-financing of the companies business through the provision of loans etc. 140 In such cases, corporate insolvency may have significant detrimental effects on the personal finances of potential respondents to a wrongful trading claim, such as to preclude any realistic chances of civil recovery. In Freedman and Godwin's study of 'micro-business'
141
, for example, over 50% of incorporated owner-mangers were found to have given personal guarantees for corporate debts, which, if replicated across larger swaths of small companies, would suggest that civil recovery proceedings could prove fruitless in large numbers of corporate insolvencies. Indeed, as is set out further below, analysis of public records of individual bankruptcies suggests a significant number of directors who have been made subject to civil recovery under s.214 declared bankruptcy shortly after judgement was entered against them. Liquidators, creditors or administrators will no doubt be aware of the likelihood of similar outcomes in many cases, reducing the incentive for them to litigate in the first place.
So fluctuations in director wealth are likely to be a significant disincentive to pursue civil recovery proceedings. This must though be seen in conjunction with evidence as to limited instances of wrongful trading in corporate insolvency cases. Fluctuations in director wealth do not, of course, affect incentives to sanction 'insolvent trading' in director disqualification proceedings, suggesting a prior reason for the limited impact of s.214 (namely that insolvent trading is rarely uncovered in investigations of the affairs of insolvent companies). Against this backdrop, though, the impecuniosity of potential respondents is likely to narrow still further the scope for application of the wrongful trading remedy.
Patterns of Misconduct and the s.214 Rule.
Further evidence of limited scope for application of the wrongful trading remedy is suggested by analysis of cases reported under the s.214 provision. The reported cases under s.214 typically involve highly complex fact patterns that do not confirm to the notion of 'wrongful trading' presented by the Cork Report. The conduct complained of by liquidators in s.214 cases often involves deliberately selfinterested misconduct on the part of a wrongdoing director that does not fit the simplistic pattern of 'indifference and lack of concern' to corporate debt because of the insulating effect of limited liability that is typically cited as the core concern of the s.214 rule. In part, the cases therefore highlight further the unreliability of Cork's analysis as a tool for predicting likely levels of litigation under the provision and undermine claims that the low number of reported cases necessarily evidences underperformance of the sanction. More than this though, the fact patterns of the cases show that the conduct sanctioned under s.214 was often equally capable of being remedied under another Insolvency Act provision. This is significant because it shows that creditors may have little need for the wrongful trading remedy in cases of actual wrongdoing.
In Re DKG Contractors Ltd 142 , by way of example, the liquidator sought to recover £417,763 from the respondent directors which it was alleged had been transferred from the insolvent company, DKG, to one of its directors, who was also a significant creditor of the company, in the 10 months leading up to its insolvency. The liquidator alleged that the transfer of the sums amounted to (i) a breach of duty for which recovery could be made under s 212 of the IA 1986, because the payments were made at a time when the company could not meet its debts as they fell due; (ii) a transaction at a preference contrary to s 239 IA 1986, in so much as the payments preferred one of the company's creditors (the director) over others; and (iii) wrongful trading contrary to s.214, it being contended that throughout the period in which the sums were transferred the respondent directors knew, or ought to have concluded that the company could not avoid insolvent liquidation. The trial judge found that all of the allegations were made out on the facts and held the directors under a concurrent liability to repay the sum of £417,763 under ss. 212, 238 and 214, with practical effect that satisfaction of liability under s.212 was held to discharge liability under s.239 and s.214.
The first thing to note about DKG from the perspective of our analysis of the wrongful trading remedy is that the claim in the case was not that the directors of DKG had indifferently 'traded whilst insolvent' because they felt themselves protected from downside risks by 'limited liability'. Rather, the claim concerned a series of self-interested transactions that were intended to prefer a directorcreditor over the general body of the company's creditors, with liability arising under s.214 because the relevant transactions took place at a time when the directors 'ought to have known' that the company could not avoid insolvent liquidation. The second thing to note is that liability under s.214 in fact provided no benefit to the creditors of DKG in that it added nothing to the sums that were in any case recoverable under s. . In eight of the cases, recovery was also sought under s.212 in relation to alleged 'misfeasance of breach of duty' by the respondent director. In four cases recovery was sought in relation to a 'transaction at a preference' contrary to s.238 144 of the Insolvency Act, and in a further four cases recovery was sought in relation to a transaction at a preference contrary to s.239.
To be sure, in some of these cases s.214 did provide apparently significant 'new' recovery for creditors in spite of overlapping liabilities 145 . In Re Bangla Television Ltd, for example, the liquidator was successful in recovering from the directors the lost value of a transfer of assets from the company that was made by the respondent directors, for no consideration, to another company they controlled. The transaction in question was a clear 'transaction at an undervalue' contrary to s.238 IA 1986, it being a clear attempt by the directors to prevent the assets of a failing company falling into the hands of creditors in liquidation proceedings. Proceedings under s.238 had, though, yielded little benefit for creditors due to the subsequent insolvency of the company to which the assets were transferred. The liquidator consequently sought to establish personal liability on the part of the directors for the lost value to the Bangla by (successfully) arguing that the transfer was made at a time when Bangla had no reasonable prospect of recovery and therefore was caught by s.214. It should be noted, though, that 143 See n 38 above, and text thereto. 144 A transaction at a preference is a pre-insolvency transaction that has the effect of putting some of the company's creditors in a better position than other creditors where a desire to so prefer the creditors concerned motivated the transaction (see e.g. there appear on the facts of the case to be no reason why the liquidator could not have sought recovery from the directors personally as part of the claim under s.238. A declaration of personally liability for directors in respect of the relevant transaction falls clearly within the scope of s.238(3) IA 1986 which permits the court to make 'whatever order it thinks fit' to remedy an undervalue transaction, and indeed it is well within the court's power to 'impose an obligation on any person' regardless of whether they are the beneficiary of the preference, set out in s.241(2) IA 1986.
A further example of the ambiguity of apparently direct benefits of s.214 liability arising from the complex nature of directors' misconduct can be seen in the case of Re Idessa (UK) Ltd 146 , where again the misconduct complained of had its root in self-interested behaviour rather than simple 'trading with indifference' to the creditors' plight. In Idessa, the liquidator brought claims against the respondent directors under ss.212, 238 and 214 of the Insolvency Act in respect of payments made from the insolvent company (Idessa) for the benefit of respondent directors at a time when it was insolvent, it being alleged that the payments amounted to a breach of duty by the directors, transactions at an undervalue, and wrongful trading. The judge found the majority of the allegations under ss.212 and 214 made out (making it unnecessary to consider the claim under s.238), and the directors were ordered to pay a total of £1,438,513.23 in respect of liabilities under both provisions. £ 340,411 of the liability was assigned by the judge to s.212, that being the sum transferred to the directors before it could be established that the company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. This resulted in nominal recovery under s.214 being set at £1,098,102, which was the sum by which the liabilities of the company had increased after it was held to have no reasonable prospect of avoiding liquidation. However, whilst this would suggest that significant recovery was made under s.214 that would otherwise be unavailable, on closer inspection it is by no means clear that all of the sums allocated to s.214 could not have been recovered under s.212. The trial judge acknowledged 147 , for example, that the figure for the net s.214 liability included a tax liability of £274,966.11 which could have been recovered under s.212 as a sum paid in breach of directors' duties. The decision to allocate recovery for the liabilities to s.214 was therefore a matter of convenience rather than a matter of law.
Section 212 IA 1986 permits a liquidator of an insolvent company to bring proceedings against directors in respect of any "misfeasance or breach of fiduciary duty" committed by them in the course of their management of a company. Directors, of course, do not owe direct duties to protect the interests' of corporate creditors in solvency or insolvency. However, following the recognition of the relevance of creditors' interests to those of the company in Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd 148 , director liability for 'insolvent trading' many be established under s.212 where the director's actions are found to disregard the collective interests of creditors in the immediate period prior to insolvency. 149 . This is true in respect of directors who continued trading an insolvent company through 'indifference and lack of concern' for creditors interests, or directors who sought to defeat creditors' interests by removing property from an insolvent, or near insolvent, company. Moreover, civil liability may be established under s.212 without the need to meet the criteria set down in s.214. However, whilst the liability provided by the rule s.214 may, in light of these developments in directors' duties, offer little that is unique to creditor protection, the rule has, at least until recent times, held a practical advantage over liability under s.212. This is that the proceeds of s.214 actions are not regarded as the 'property' of the company and so are not subject to the rights of floating charge holders 153 . As such, s.214 liability is likely to be particularly useful for unsecured creditors of insolvent companies. In contrast, sums recovered under s.212 are regarded as property of the insolvent company because they arise before liquidation and so may be caught by an appropriately drafted floating charge 154 . The advantage that s.214 proceedings might be seen to enjoy in this respect, however, must now be seen in light of the 'prescribed part rule' in s 176A IA 1986. This rule was first introduced into the Insolvency Act 1986 by the Enterprise Act of 2002 and provides that 'prescribed part' of the assets of an insolvent company subject to a floating charge shall be held back by the liquidator from the charge-holder to be distributed to the unsecured creditors of the insolvent corporation. As such, unsecured creditors should derive some benefit from the proceeds of misfeasance proceedings even where that 'property' of the company is subject to an appropriately drafted floating charge.
Post-Judgement Solvency of Respondent Directors.
An important note should be added about the post-judgement solvency of directors made liable to civil recovery under s.214. Nineteen individuals were made subject to civil liability in reported s.214 cases between 1986-2013. The amount of biographical detail provided about those respondents obviously varies significantly from case to case. However, it was possible to check biographical details of the majority of respondents with details of individual insolvencies recorded in the official Gazette using The Gazette's online search facility. 155 This search suggests that, with a high degree of likelihood, seven of those respondent directors were declared bankrupt, or filled for bankruptcy, within six months of judgement having been entered against them under s.214. These likely bankruptcies were identified principally by the names of respondent directors in s.214 cases exactly matching the names of individuals declared insolvent in Gazette notice. A variety of other data extracted from the relevant case report was used to corroborate initial matches, such match including the geographical location of the individual insolvent matching that of the insolvent company and the occupation of the relevant individuals listed in the individual insolvency register as being "Company Director". The likely bankruptcy rate amongst directors subject liability s.214 liability on this data would therefore be in excess of one-third. Of course, the sample size here is a very small, and one and one should be cautious about drawing too wide a conclusion as to the post-liability solvency of directors across the board. Nonetheless, the data lends support to the notion that many directors simply may not be worth pursing for civil recovery and certainly shows that creditors are likely to have gained little from s.214 liability (or any other Insolvency Act liability), in a significant number of the reported cases. 
CONCLUSION
There is little doubting the importance that is attached to the wrongful trading remedy by many policy makers and commentators in efforts to combat abuses of limited liability by rogue directors. There is little room too for doubting the widely held view that the limited impact of s.214 can, in the main, be attributed to statutory restrictions on the scope of the remedy. It is little surprise therefore that proposals to extend the scope of the remedy should be seen as an effective method to improve financial redress for creditors of failed companies.
The proposed reforms to the wrongful trading remedy are, however, modest and would seem to hold out little hope of achieving their stated goal a significant expansion in civil recovery from wrongdoing directors, and as a result, neither are they likely to significantly enhance the deterrent impact of the sanction. Including administration proceedings within the scope of the section would bring relatively few new cases within the scope of the rule and it seems unlikely that a significant market for wrongful trading actions would develop if office holders were given rights to sell or assign the proceeds of causes of action under the rule. The most significant flaw in the reform proposals is not, however, their over optimism about expanding the scope of the the wrongful trading rule. It is rather the fact that they proceed on an assumption that that current modest levels of litigation represent a significant underperformance of the sanction relative to the problem of wrongful trading.
The available evidence, suggests that this assumption is without foundation and even more radical reform of wrongful trading rule than that proposed would be unlikely to transform it from being a rarely used remedy. Data from almost 8,000 directors' disqualification cases suggest that 'insolvent trading' is rarely identified in the affairs of in affairs on insolvent companies, where radically different criteria are applied and cost factors are less of a disincentive to litigation. This is lent support by comparative analysis of the Australian wrongful trading rule and effective changes to the funding of insolvency litigation made by the s.174ZA IA 1986. On top of this, doubts over the solvency of respondent directors are likely to narrow still further opportunities for civil recovery under s.214, and overlapping liabilities under other provisions of the IA may mean that creditors are often not reliant on the wrongful trading rule to obtain redress against wrongdoing directors.
None of this is, of course, to say that wrongful trading does not occur and that on some occasions the remedy may provide useful redress to creditors, or even deter some wrongful conduct, in terms of providing compensatory redress to creditors the post-liability insolvency of respondent directors may raise doubts over the exact benefits of the rule. But what has been argued here is that expectations of the potential impact of the wrongful trading rule are based on unfounded claims about the scale of wrongful trading, not least those evident in the Cork Report. There is simply no evidence that Cork's call for a 'radical' extension in civil liability through the introduction of a wrongful trading was ever likely to realised in the sense of large-scale liability orders under s.214. Nor is there any reasonable basis upon on which to conclude that current modest levels of reported litigation under the rule are radically out of line with instances of insolvent trading. There is, as such, no ground upon which to suppose that reform of wrongful trading remedy is likely to have anything other than a marginal effect on the impact of the provision, either in terms of securing 'better compensation' for creditors, or in terms of deterring misconduct. It is, as such, vital that we look beyond the implicit assumptions of the Cork Report in evaluating both the current performance of the wrongful trading remedy and the likely impact of reforms to the rule. To be sure s.214 may be a useful tool in some cases, but the available evidence suggests that its role in regulating directors is inherently limited by factors independent of the particular criteria included in a statutory rule. The gains of reform are, as such, likely to be limited.
